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Based on a framework that conceives of ownership (property
rights) as "a bundle of rights," We propose four types of ownership
system, build concept models of "functional socialism" and "func
tional capitalism," and then try to clarify the reality of Chinas
"socialist market economy"
We reached the following conclusions. First, we schematize the
correspondence between "functional socialism" and "functional capi
talism." Second, we show that a process of land ownership reform
and state-owned enterprises reform corresponded with a schema
of "functional capitalism." Third, we found that the ownership
structure of the "socialist market economy" in China is now sepa
rated into three different sets of rights regarding ownership (prop
erty rights). Finally, we show that the reality of the "socialist
market economy" is not a free market, but a market controlled by
the Communist Party.
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1. Introduction: analytical viewpoint^^
Following the remarkable rise of Chinas economy, there has been an increase in
discussion about the diverse forms that capitalism can take.^^However, when one
considers that China calls its own system a "socialist market economy," one may
wonder if it is better to think about the multiple forms that socialism can take. In
*This paper is an expansion and revision of my previous working paper (2015), "Gendai chuugoku niokeru
'shakai shugi shijou keizai no jittai—'kinou teki shihon shugi" ("The reality of modern China's 'socialist market
economy': 'functional capitalism'") Paper Series J-43, Economic Society of Kansai University.
1) For more on this section and the next, see Takeshita (1992), pp. 1-6.
2) For more on the discussion regarding the diversity of capitalism, see Boumol, Litan, and Schramm (2007).
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this paper, we intend to present two ideas of "functional socialism" and "functional
capitalism," as tools by which to understand the diversity of economic systems; in
order to check the validity of these ideas—especially the latter, "functional capi
talism"—we intend to clarify the actual state of Chinas "socialist market economy,"
while focusing on the system of ownership, which is the main factor in an economic
system.
In Comparative Economic Systems, economic systems are generally classified by
two axes: ownership system and resource allocation system (or mutual coordination
system). The focal point of ownership system is private property or state property
(public property), and that of resource allocation system is market or planning. As
a result, there are thought to be four kinds of economic systems: capitalist economic
system (private property and market), socialist economic system (state property and
planning), planned capitalist economic system (private property and planning), and
market socialist economic system (state property and market). According to this
schema, contemporary China's economic system is a market socialist economic
system of state property (public property) and market—or, as they call it in China,
a "socialist market economy." The definitive split between capitalism and socialism
is found in their ownership system—that is to say, whether ownership is private or
state (public). In reality, in contemporary China, the "socialist market economy" is
structured with a public property system at its core. In other words, the "socialism"
of the "socialist market economy" is secured by putting a public property system at
the core.
In this way, the largest factor regulating the "socialist market economy" in
contemporary China is thought to be the ownership system. We would like to
consider the reality of China's "socialist market economy" from the viewpoint of the
ownership system and understand ownership rights not as a question of the "real
sphere," but essentially as a question of the "control sphere." However, in the "control
sphere," "control-ability" in general is not equivalent to ownership; in the "control
sphere," even within "control-ability" in general, ownership rights become equivalent
to "control-ability" only after having overcome harsh conditions. In other words, the
notion of ownership is equivalent to a more limited (and stronger) idea of "control-
ability." As we attempt to clarify the peculiarities and points in question regarding
ownership systems, our starting point will not be an ordinary degree of "control-
ability," but the concept of ownership in this meaning.
3) The idea of the "real sphere" and the "control sphere" comes from Kornai (1971). Furthermore, "control
lability" as a basic category of property rights (ownership) comes from Yoshida (1981). Again, for a fuller
discussion about ownership system frameworks, including these, see Takeshita (1987) and Takeshita (1992).
First, I would like to raise five points (elements) that provide a basic overview
of analytical frameworks, through which to consider systems of ownership: subjects,
objects, contents, belonging, and justification (reason). For the first, subjects of prop
erty, we may consider different systems of classification: for example, private indi
viduals, collectives, and corporate bodies; corporate bodies, natural persons, and
unincorporated groups; or higher-ranked subjects and lower-ranked subjects. For the
second, objects of property, we may consider material resources, information
resources, human resources, and relational resources. The third, contents of property,
encompasses a set of multiple rights that comprise the content of ownership, including
the right of exclusive possession, right of use, right of revenue, and right of disposi
tion, as well as multiple concrete rights that fall under each of these larger rights
(i.e., a bundle of rights). The fourth, called belonging of property, is a little more
arcane, but relates to when the contents of property concerning the object of prop
erty belong to the owner, and depends on whether that belonging is exclusive or
non-exclusive, whether or not there is a time limit, and the length of such a time
limit, if there is one; generally, exclusive, unlimited belonging leads to stronger owner
ship, and non-exclusive, short-term belonging leads to weaker ownership. The final
point, justification of property (reason) concerns whether specific ownership is socially
accepted in the society concerned, in consideration of any social norms or social
values (e.g., freedom, equality, or efficiency).
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Source: Yoshida (1981) p.232, edited and revised.
Figure 1: Four types of ownership system
To understand what kind of ownership systems could be considered in practice,
we can draw the four types of ownership systems (Figure 1),^^ by focusing on the
4) Yoshida's (1981) "Theory of property rights structure" conceives of itself as part of "Theory of social
system" and asserts that the concept of "social control-ability" is positioned as basic category of "theory of
four points of subjects, objects, contents, and belonging. To simplify, here we will
assume that the property contents of the property objects belong entirely to the
owner (i.e., completely exclusive belonging). Furthermore, although subjects, objects,
and contents of property in Figure 1 have been portrayed as limited, in reality, this
is not the case. Above all, in the analysis of ownership systems, it is important to
keep in mind that, as pointed out above, the contents of property can be very diverse.
In figure 1, Type A represents objects-comprehensive and contents-comprehen
sive ownership. As a concrete example, in the notion of centrally controlled socialism,
state ownership is thought to apply. In this situation, SI is the state (or collectives).
Type B absolutely epitomizes the absolute modern property rights in a modern civil
society: they are objects-divisible (i.e., division of the tangible entity) and contents-
comprehensive (i.e., freedom of usage, enjoyment of yields and disposition), with
comprehensive belonging (completely exclusive belonging without time limit). Type C
represents objects-comprehensive, contents-divisible property rights—for example, the
separation of ownership and management typical in a modern capitalism (VI = stock
holder's right, V2 = right of management; SI = the shareholders, 82 = the manager).
Type D represents objects-mixed and contents-divisible ownership, as seen in the
decentralization of socialism, with state ownership and management by state-owned
enterprises. In this instance, VI is superior authority (ownership), V2 is for middle
to lower level authority (management rights), 81 is the state, and 82 and 83 represent
state-owned enterprises. Logically, objects-divisible and contents-mixed ownership are
conceivable, but this is not shown, because in reality there has been a mix of Type
B and Type C; absolutely no other type of ownership has manifested.
2. ^ Tunctional socialism'' and ^ ^functional capitalism"
In this paper, contemporary China's "socialism market economy" is understood
by using the idea of "functional capitalism." First, we will explain the idea of "func
tional capitalism" and show how it relates to the analytical framework and typology
of ownership systems.
First, we deliberately present here the idea of "functional capitalism" as a
response to the idea of "functional socialism." The idea of "functional socialism" was
itself initially introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, when the illusion of approaching a
property rights structure." In this paper, what is described in "theory of property rights structure" as "a
simple formation model of 'the first structure of control-ability"* is used as "the four types of ownership
system" (Figure 1) to simplify the discussion.
5) For more on "functional socialism." see Adler-Karlsson (1967).
socialist economic system was still strong, as a way of thinking where there was no
need for revolution in order to establish socialist ideals, and that there would be no
harm to the form and essence of capitalism, or its accomplishments. In other words,
there was the thinking that it was possible to substantially implement socialist func
tions peacefully and gradually This way of thinking is explained by Swedish econo
mist Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (1967) as "functional socialism," through the partial
socialization of various functions; he does so by using the idea of ownership, wherein
"ownership is usually viewed as an indivisible concept, ownership should
instead be viewed as a divisible concept which covers a number of functions which
an owner potentially may exert over an owned object," that is, "O equals functions
a plus b plus c, etc. or
This way of thinking is similar to the perception of the property rights approach
as one in which property rights (ownership) are understood as "a bundle of rights."
According to this way of thinking, fundamentally, when various rights completely
and exclusively belong to specific individuals, this constitutes modern ownership
(Type B in Figure 1), and when exclusivity is weakened, or attenuated, various prop
erty rights connected to the implementation of various functions spring up to propor
tionately weaken it again (Type A, Type C, and Type D in Figure 1). "Functional
socialism" could be described as being on the line of this perception of ownership.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the idea of "functional socialism" was a guiding principle
of social democratic parties in Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, which were
implementing social democratic policies. The "functional capitalism" way of thinking
is a response to this idea of "functional socialism." Accordingly, "functional capitalism"
is the implementation of what are for all intents and purposes capitalist functions,
while preserving socialism as a structure. Expressed in response to the aforemen
tioned "functional socialism," it may then be understood as a way of thinking
whereby capitalist functions are implemented by partially privatizing various func
tions that had been held by the socialist state, and transferring them to private sector
(individuals and private enterprises).
In order to understand at a basic level the relationship between "functional
socialism" or "functional capitalism" and the analytical framework of ownership
systems, the first thing to understand is that in this framework, the functions such
as a, b, c , constituting ownership in functional socialism, are equivalent to "contents
of property." To "socialize parts of the functions" means that the contents of property
6) Adler-Karlsson (1970) pp.37, 50 : Adler-Karlsson (1967) pp.25, 65 (in Japanese version).
7) For a good example of this way of thinking, see Barzel (1997).
are divided, the divided portions are possessed by different subjects, and the "exclu
sivity of belonging" is restricted (to that extent, it means to weaken ownership). To
schematize this using Figure 1, "functional socialism" can be depicted as shown in
Figure 2.
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Notes: 1) The meanings of the abbreviations and dotted/solid lines are the same as those
in Figure 1. Arrows pointing downwards show the limitations on appropriate
contents of property (V)—in other words, the weakening of the exclusivity of
belonging. Regarding other contents of property, completely exclusive ownership
applies.
2) SI and 82 in Type B, Type BD, and Type D basically represent individuals, and
S3 may represent public organizations. In type A, SI represents the state or
collectives (groups).
Figure 2: "Functional socialism"
In Figure 2, Type B (represented on the left side) represents ownership in a
typical capitalist economy. Functional socialism, as shown in Type BD, is a situation
in which restrictions are imposed through controls on property content (V2) that has
social significance. Additionally, there are situations (functional socialism) as shown
in Type D, in which property contents that similarly have social importance (V2) are
transferred to another subject (such as a public institution, S3). However, functional
socialism does not switch over to socialist ownership (Type A) as shown on the right
side, either logically or in practice. After all, functional socialism was advocated as
a strategy that does not require a revolution.
So how would be "functional capitalism" represented as a counterpart to the
"functional socialism" depicted in Figure 2? "Functional capitalism" attempts to imple
ment capitalist functions by de-socializing (i.e., shifting to individuals or private
enterprises) some of the many functions otherwise held by the state in a socialist
system. What is meant by this is that those many functions (property contents) are
divided and transferred to private sector (individuals or private enterprises), "exclu
sivity of belonging" is reinforced, and the rights of individuals or private enterprises
are strengthened. If this were to be schematized using the typology of ownership in
Figure 1, "functional capitalism" would be derived, as shown in Figure 3.
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Notes: 1) The meanings of the abbreviations and dotted/solid lines are the same as those
in Figure 1. Arrows pointing upwards show the strengthening of appropriate
contents of property (V)—in other words, the strengthening of the exclusivity of
belonging. Regarding other contents of property, completely exclusive ownership
applies.
2) SI in Type A, Type AD, and Type D represents the state or collectives (groups),
while 82 and S3 represent individuals. In Type B, SI and S2 also represent indi
viduals.
Figure 3: "Functional capitalism"
In Figure 3, the Type A on the left side type shows state property (public prop
erty), which is the typical form of ownership under socialism. "Functional capitalism,"
as shown in Type AD, generally tries to provide incentives and strengthen the func
tions (V2) of the individual or private enterprises (S2, S3) under the condition that
there would be no damage to the system of state property (public property).
Additionally, as shown in Type D, property contents are divided into those (VI)
where the system of state property (public property) has been maintained and those
(V2) where it has not been maintained; the former (VI) are left with the state (81),
and the latter (V2) are transferred to individuals or private enterprises (82, 83). In
this way, "functional socialism" and "functional capitalism" can be understood in
similar terms within the framework of the ownership systems, if one acknowledges
that reforms are moving in absolute opposite directions. Logically, as with functional
socialism, functional capitalism does not switch over to capitalist ownership (Type B)
as shown on the right side. However, in practice, in the former 8oviet Union and in
Eastern European countries, that line was crossed. How should one make sense of
this? Could there be a crucial difference between "functional socialism" and "func
tional capitalism"? What is the current status in China, and how might we expect it
to change over time? Using the analytical framework described above and with an
awareness of these issues, the object of enquiry will now be the progress of China,
organized and considered with a focus on the ownership system.
3. China's land ownership system: state ownership and collective
ownership^^
In order to address the question of property rights (ownership) in China, we
would like to start with the question of land ownership, which is the foundation for
property rights questions on the whole. Modern China's land ownership system was
established in the 1982 "current Constitution" (article 10) and 1986 "Land Management
Law" (article 2), such that public property takes two forms: state land ownership (all
people's ownership) in urban areas, and collective land ownership (farmers' collective
ownership) in rural areas. There no private ownership is admitted. To understand
these basic structures of state ownership and collective ownership, one starting point
is to think about each of the five elements of ownership(property rights) that follow
the framework for analyzing ownership systems, as described in section 1: (1)
subjects, (2) objects, (3) contents, (4) belonging, and (5) justification (reason).
First, state land ownership are defined in law by the state as the right to the
exclusive possession, usage, yields, and disposition of state land. Regarding (1) the
subjects of property rights, state property is owned by all people (i.e., all people's
ownership), and so all citizens of China have the right to exclusively own, use, derive
yields, and dispose of their own land through the state. However, in practice, the
subject of state land ownership is "the state as the representative of the will and
interests of all people." Namely, the state is the subject that exercises ownership as
the representative of all the people, by the trust of the people. In concrete terms,
the State Council of the People's Republic of China—which is the government of the
Chinese people—is the sole representative of state ownership, and each regional
government exercises ownership as a representative of the state, as authorized by
the State Council.
Regarding (2) the objects of property, in article 10 of the Constitution and article
8 of the Land Management Law, the objects are all land in each urban area, and
land within urban city limits. Outside of this, the Law of Realty^^ makes clear that
other three types of land are added as the objects of state property; land occupied
by state-owned businesses, energy, transportation, waterways; land occupied by state-
8) For more on China's land ownership system, the studies of Oda (2002) and Oda (2004) are valuable, in
that they systematically consider the history of China's land system and the problems and peculiarities of
land reforms. Additionally, Wang and Huang (1996) and Fu (2006) also offer valuable information on the
history, status, and problems of China's land ownership system. This section uses these studies for refer
ence.
9) On the problems and peculiarities of the law of realty in China, as enacted in 2007, see the essays collected
in Hoshino, Qu, Tanaka, and Liang (2008).
9owned cultural, health, educational, and military facilities; and non-developed or
otherwise-unauthorized land as collectively owned land.
Regarding (3) the contents and (4) belonging of property, property contents
comprising exclusive ownership, usage, yields, and disposition belong entirely and
exclusively to the state. In other words, state-owned land is eternally state property,
and the state cannot transfer or renounce its ownership of state property. However,
as will be mentioned later, in 1988, the Constitution and Land Management Law
were reformed, and ever since the "land use rights system"—which allows for the
separation of "rights to own (ownership)" and "rights to use (use rights)" land—it has
been possible to transfer the use rights of state property, for a fee. Finally, regarding
(5) justification, this is genuinely a major problem; however, here, undertaking a
structural analysis of ownership is the main point of analysis, and so for the time
being, we will simply state that the whole of communist ideology is the reason for
justifying state ownership.
Next, collective ownership of land in rural areas is the right of farmers' groups
within the law to exclusively own, use, derive yields from, and dispose of their own
land; the land is not entrusted to any individual within the organization, nor is it
jointly owned by the members of the organization. In other words, because it belongs
to the entirety of the organization, the land cannot be divided, and even if the
membership of the organization were to change, there is no change to the ownership
rights themselves. (1) The subjects of collective ownership is defined as "collective
ownership" according to article 10 of the Constitution, as prescribed; however, there
is no unitary subject of collective ownership as a whole of China, and it is influenced
by its formation process and more complicated than the state land ownership. If one
were to consult related laws such as the Civil Law Principles (article 74, clause 2),
the Land Management Law (article 10), and the Agriculture Law (article 11). one
would see that the subjects of collective ownership is one of three kinds of farmers'
groups: a "village farmers' group," a "township and village farmers' group," or an
"economic organization of farmers' group." However, in each law, the organization and
structure of these groups (collectives) are not clearly defined. In any case, in contrast
to the unitary nature of state ownership, in each area and district, there are tens of
thousands of farmers' groups that are the subjects of property.
(2) The objects of property are land in farm villages and suburbs of towns and
cities. Regarding (3) the contents of property, the owner more or less has the right
to exclusive possession, usage, yields, and disposition of the collectively owned land,
but collective land ownership rights are not complete ownership rights, and they can
use the land only for agricultural production, while abiding by the state's agricultural
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policies and arable land protection policies. Additionally, (4) belonging of property is
considerably limited; for example, the only way that land can be transferred is
through expropriation by the state, and abandoned land automatically becomes state
property. Considered from this perspective, it is understandable that collective land
ownership has a lower position than state ownership. This point, as we will explain
below, can be seen even in the application of land use rights for development
purposes. Finally, regarding (5) the justification of property, although I would like to
bring up communist ideology as the rationale—^just as it was the reason for state
ownership—I would still add one more point in relation to the fact that agricultural
land was made into collective property, rather than state property. It is thought that
agricultural land became collectively owned as a consequence of political compro
mises made with farmers: the success of the revolution was indivisibly connected to
their support, because the Chinese revolution had developed from bases in agricul
tural communities.
If one were to schematize the state ownership and collective ownership of land
into the ownership system typology, although the ownership of the former would be
superior to the latter, the types would both be considered objects-comprehensive,
contents-comprehensive ownership (Type A), as shown in Figure 1. Of course, in that
case, it goes without saying that the subject of property (SI) would be the state in
state ownership, and farmers' groups in collective ownership.
4. Ownership and rights to use""
In modern China, the two basic forms of public property system for land as
defined in the current Constitution (1982) and the Land Management Law (1986)
have not changed from the time of the Reform and Opening-up Policy until the
present day; nonetheless, the contents of property rights have changed a great deal.
In the 1988 reforms to the Constitution and the Land Management Law, based on
the reality of economic activity after the Reform and Opening-up Policy (such as the
farmers' household responsibility system) the "land use rights system" was estab
lished, recognizing a separation between "ownership" (rights to own) and the "use
rights" of land. Since then, by maintaining and reforming laws relating to land, even
tually, "Law of Realty" was established in 2007, and the current land tenure system
with a separation of ownership and the rights of use (usufruct) appeared to be more
or less complete. We would like to organize and investigate the fundamental struc-
10) This section also uses, as mentioned above, Oda (2002). Oda (2004). Wang and Huang (1996), and Fu (2006)
for reference.
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ture of the land ownership system under the Reform and Opening-up Policy (the
structure of "separation into the two rights" of rights to own and rights to use) by
comparing it to the fundamental structure of the land ownership system at the time
that the Reform and Opening-up Policy went into effect.
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V2 SI i SI use rights fanner) fanncr2 use rights citizen 1 citizen2
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Note: The meanings of the abbreviations and dotted/solid lines are the same as those in
Figure 1. The word of "group'means the collectives as the subjects of collective
ownership.
Figure 4: Land ownership and land use rights
To begin with, the basic land ownership system is a "land use rights system,"
whereby the contents of property are separated into "rights to own" and "rights to
use" land. First, regarding land ownership relationships under the socialist system of
public property, the rights to use property approved formally for state property in
urban areas are the "land use rights of state property" (use rights for building lots),
and the rights to use approved similarly for collective property ("farmers' group
property") in rural areas are the "land use rights of collective property" (rights of
responsibility for collective property). The use of all land is controlled in order to
ensure rational use; land resources have been separated into "agricultural sites"
(farming areas), "construction sites" (urban areas), and "unused sites"; land use zones
are defined according to a comprehensive land use plan; and restrictions on land use
rights are agreed upon. Besides the land ownership rights mentioned in the previous
paragraph, if one were to schematize "land use rights of state property" (construction
site use rights) and "land use rights of collective property" (rights of responsibility
for collective property) according to the ownership system typology, they would
appear as shown in Figure 4. One can see how "functional capitalism" has progressed,
if one looks at the correspondence between the Type A and Type D ownership in
Figure 3, and the Type A and Type D ownership in Figure 4. In each case, there
were two contents(rights) of property —namely, "land ownership rights of collective
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property" ® and "land use rights of collective property" (D, and "land ownership
rights of state property" O and "land use rights of state property" O.
In Figure 4, both "state land ownership" and "collective land ownership" are
shown as the same type of ownership rights as Type A (as mentioned above), and
"land use rights of state property" and "land use rights of collective property" are
also shown with the same structure. Therefore, at first sight, the use rights and
ownership rights appear to be equivalent both in collective and state property.
However, in practice, because originally in land ownership "state land ownership" has
taken priority over "collective land ownership," also in land use rights, "state land
use rights" have taken priority over "collective land use rights." For example,
obtaining land use rights for new developments on land in urban areas is limited to
land that has been defined as "construction sites" ("state land use rights"): this is
made apparent by the fact that no "collective land use rights" have been approved
for development. In the process for obtaining land use rights for development, there
are "transfers" (disposal sale) and "allocations." Land use rights for purposes such as
urban infrastructure and land for military use are assigned (allocated) with an
indefinite term of use, but for general residential, commercial, and industrial purposes,
state land use rights are generally obtained through transfers. As a rule, it was
decided to transfer land use rights not through consultation forms, but through a
price competition process by means of bidding, sale, or public notification. However,
in practice, there has generally been a consultation process in the same way as until
now. Furthermore, when land use rights are acquired, retained, or transferred, taxes
are paid—such as a sales tax (contract tax), a land use tax, or a land increase tax.
On the other hand, when carrying out a new development in the suburbs of towns
and cities, land must first be changed from farmers' group ownership for agricultural
use into state ownership, and then converted into a construction site, before going
through the transfer process for land use rights.
The difference of position with regard to "land use rights of state property"
(construction site use rights) and "land use rights of collective property" (rights of
responsibility for collective property) has produced the characteristic phenomena in
contemporary China.^^^ Although a great deal of land has been required for economic
development and urbanization in China—which has undergone rapid progress since
the Reforming and Opening-up Policy—the transfer and trade of "land ownership" is
11) In contemporary China, many problems have arisen in relation to land and politics, such as excess land
development by regional governments—something born of the distorted land system and subsequent over-
dependence on land finance, large agriculture site levies, farmers' loss of farmland, and a sudden drop in
the amount of available arable land. For more on these problems and an analysis that takes up "land
politics" by using agency theory, see Ni (2012).
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not permitted, as is to be expected in a country that still adheres to its socialist
public ownership system. For this reason, a rapidly increasing demand for industrial,
commercial, and residential land has been met by the obtaining of "land use rights":
although the only thing that can (legally) respond directly to demand in urban areas
is the "land use rights of state property," this is quantitatively inadequate. In practice,
high demand is quantitatively and economically advantageous with regard to agricul
tural land on the suburbs of towns and cities; however, "land use rights of collective
property" (rights of responsibility for collective property) cannot legally respond
directly to demand. Because agricultural land is farmers' group property, it is neces
sary to go through the process of converting it into a state property construction
site. Under the Land Management Law, land registration, management authority, use
authorization authority, and the authority for the disposition of illegal acts are all
centralized—not at the central or provincial government level, but at the administra
tive level below the province (i.e., the city, prefecture, or village, especially the
prefectural government). In other words, because various interests and rights are
centralized at the city, prefecture, or village administrative level, a real-estate bubble
has appeared in a way that is unique to the conditions of China.
In this way, on the one hand, it is clear that the different positions of ownership
and use rights are connected to problems such as the real-estate bubble and land
finance dependence of the prefectural governments, but on the other hand, it is also
clear that the separation of land ownership and use rights is one of the keystones
of the Reform and Opening-up Policy; this is part of what has driven the high rate
of economic invigoration. That is to say, in the planned economy system before the
Reform and Opening-up Policy, the separation of land ownership and use rights was
absolutely never accepted, and the rational distribution and efficient use of land was
obstructed in order to supply land, without compensation, for use by businesses or
farmers, and for an indefinite length of time. In China's public property system, the
groundbreaking scheme and policy that helped resolve this problem was the estab
lishment of the "land use rights system," which separated use rights from land
ownership. It would be no exaggeration to say that, subsequently, China's progress
to date from its Reform and Opening-up Policy, as well as its accompanying radical
economic development, have been pushed forward by the separation of ownership
and use rights—a separation associated with two sets of land use rights (i.e., land
use rights of state property and collective property). Focusing on this point, in
sections 5 and 6, we would like to discuss in detail the progress of land ownership
system reforms in rural areas, and state-owned enterprise reform in urban areas.
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5. Reform of the land ownership system (rural areas)^^^
China's Reform and Opening-up Policy was started in December 1978 by the
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping. The consistent directions of the Reform and Opening-up Policy were
reforms towards marketization which include the removal or cutting of instructive
factors from economic planning administration and the introduction of a flexible
pricing system that reflected supply and demand; however, at the same time, in order
for the market to function effectively, one precondition was a process by which to
advance concurrent reforms to property rights. The property rights reforms in China
included reforms to the land ownership system in rural areas, and reforms to state-
owned enterprises in urban areas. Agricultural community reforms began with
moving the administration units for agricultural production from people's communes
to farmers, and introducing an "every house production contract system," to incen-
tivize production increases. In the early 1980s, the production contract system spread
rapidly and farmers' incentive to produce increased, bringing huge success. On the
back of those results, from the mid-1980s, there was a rapid development in "town
ship and village enterprises." During this time, coastal urban areas rapidly developed
with the introduction of foreign capital, due to the policy of free-access zones; this
rivaled the development of agricultural reforms and township and village enterprises,
and even further advanced progress towards a market-oriented economy. Nonetheless,
the reforms of the 1980s—especially those of the early 1980s—were primarily
reforms in the non-state property and non-planning sectors; due to the success of
the production contract system and the township and village enterprises, the gap
between rural areas and urban areas was becoming smaller.
The movement to a market economy, which stagnated for a while after the 1989
Tiananmen Square Incident, was reignited in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping gave the
"Southern Tour Lecture"; however, the central reforms that would lead to the estab
lishment of a "socialist market economy" were finally moving into state property and
planning sectors in urban areas. The progress of reforms in the 1990s and thereafter,
along with rapid economic growth, led to a rapidly widening gap between urban and
rural areas, and from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the so-called Three
Agricultural Problems emerged. Once again, the problems that agriculture, rural
communities, and farmers faced were taken up on a grand scale, and full-blown
12) Oda (2004) is a most excellent work on the subject of China's agricultural land ownership system reforms.
This section uses it for reference.
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reforms were considered, leading to an acceleration of the reform movement. The
Three Agricultural Problems—namely, the basic problems of agricultural under
production, the decay of rural communities, and poverty among farmers—were in
short due to the smallness of scale of agricultural management. In China's rural
areas, given the limitations of traditional land ownership, the production contract
system introduced in the early 1980s (rural use rights) had not been able to create
sufficient change.
Land in China's rural areas (rural land) takes the form of "collective land owner
ship" (farmers' property system). From our perspective, collective property in rural
China can be understood typologically, in the same way as state property in concep
tual centralized socialism—namely, as an objects-comprehensive, contents-comprehen
sive ownership (Type A). The subject of property (SI) is the farmers' group (organi
zation), and the farmers' group has the authority of disposition and management;
although the individual farmers who comprise the collective (organization) have equal
rights of use and yields under the collective, they do not hold shares and can neither
claim a portion nor transfer that portion. Accordingly, even if collectively owned
agricultural land were to have separate ownership and use rights, with farmers being
granted use rights (production contracts), relocation of use rights would be subject
to the consensus of opinion in the farmers' group to which a farmer belongs (i.e., a
two-thirds majority of members or villagers' representatives). As a result, relocation
of use rights (production contracts) and farmer's free choice of it would be greatly
restricted. Even if relocation were approved, it would be exclusively for within one
farmers' group. This peculiar characteristic can be attributed to the "principles of
self-government and autonomy" approved in farmers' groups as a consequence of
collective property, and across China, tens of thousands of such farmers' groups exist.
To further complicate the problem, these "principles of self-government and autonomy"
are, in reality, subject to a variety of regulations and restrictions, in line with the
national government's "principles of guidance and guardianship." In rural areas that
are engaged in this complicated state of affairs, the aggregation of agricultural land
is not progressing; consequently, the farms are small, techniques are slow to
modernize, production is low, and yields are not increasing. As a result, because many
farmers are leaving the land for which they have use rights (contract) and seeking
a considerably larger income in a town or city, agricultural land in China is decaying.
To resolve the Three Agricultural Problems, agricultural modernization policies
have been advancing in recent years by virtue of the "fiuidizing" of agricultural land
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(i.e., making it easier for agricultural land to circulate).'^' This movement began in
March 2003, when the "Agricultural Land Contract Law" was implemented, but real
progress started in October 2008 when the "Central Committee decision regarding
a number of great problems for the promotion of rural reform and development" was
adopted by the Third Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee; thereafter, the
relocation of farmers' rights of management of land contracts was formally accepted
for the first time. The most important aspects of agricultural modernization reforms
due to the fiuidization of agricultural land included conversion from a system of "two
partitions" of land ownership and land use rights (contract rights) under "land use
rights of collective property," to a new system featuring the "three partitions" of land
ownership, land use rights (contract rights), and land management rights; attempts
to advance the aggregation of agricultural land and increases in farm size through
the fiuidization (circulation) of land management rights; and attempts to promote
technological modernization. In other words, these new system reforms moved
toward collective property, farming contracts, and pluralistic management, but since
enforcing the "Farmers' Specialist Cooperatives Law" in 2007, farmers' cooperative
organizations (e.g., farmers' specialist cooperatives and farmers' public limited compa
nies, as well as trusts for incentives to promote land transactions) are now more
frequently seen in several advanced regions, and there are now a variety of farm
management choices available.
Using the ownership system typology, progress in land ownership system reforms
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land
Type D
land
Type D
land
ownei-ship group group ownership group group ownership group group ownership group ;1 group
(use rights) group group U.SC rights fanner)^ (■ariner2|^ use rights Cannerl tanner2 J use rights farmerl farmer!
production contract riyhts (jnianage- Tanner! famter2
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Note: The meanings of the abbreviations and dotted/solid lines are the same as those in
Figure 1. The meaning of "group"is the same as that in Figure 4.
Figure 5: Reforms to the land use rights system
13) For more on recent movements in such agricultural modernization policies by means of the fiuidization of
agricultural land and the system of "three partitions" of rural ownership, contract rights, and management
rights, see Guan (2008), Guan (2014), and BTMU {China) Financial News (2015).
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in rural China following the Reform and Opening-up Policy can be presented sche
matically, as shown in Figure 5.
Figures shows the process of moving from ® collective land ownership, via
(D the stage of farmers' land use schemes with their original spontaneity, to (I) the
stage of formally approved land use rights (production contract rights). This corre
sponds precisely to the "functional capitalism" in Figure 3. Furthermore, currently,
reforms in collective land ownership in China are moving from (3) a "two partition"
stage of ownership and use rights to (D a "three partition" stage of ownership, use
rights, and management rights, by a separation of management right from use rights.
Namely, another step is being taken towards "functional capitalism," by separating
management rights from "two partition" stage and attempting to increase liquidity
and promote both rational distribution and efficient use.
6. Reforms to state-owned enterprises (urban areas)^^^
Reforms to state-owned enterprises in urban areas also began with the Reform
and Opening-up Policy, but the full-scale commencement of reforms to state-owned
enterprises was spurred by the 1984 "Chinese Communist Party decision on economic
system reforms." Although at first the reforms of the 1980s pushed progress in the
direction of greater management autonomy while keeping the ownership system
within state property, before long, these essentially limited and illogical reforms
reached the limits of their efficacy. Thereafter, from 1987, a "contract system"—
whereby profits delivered to the government are contracted in advance, and the
excess amount is no longer returned to the government, but instead becomes the
property of the enterprise—was implemented in almost all state-owned enterprises.
However, even this had limited efficacy, in the wake of the unexpected Tiananmen
Square Incident and a subsequent business slump. Reforms to state-owned enter
prises in the 1980s were largely attempts to reproduce in state-owned enterprises in
urban areas the success of the production contract system (land use rights) in rural
areas; however, the contract systems of rural areas and state-owned enterprises were
fundamentally different in terms of changes to the value of enterprise property, such
that enterprise management can buy and sell enterprise property (e.g., land, build
ings, equipment, manufactured goods, materials), whereas agricultural use rights did
not involve the disposal of land itself.
14) For more on the direction of reforms with regard to state-owned enterprises, see Xu (2008), Marukawa
(2013), and Tanaka (2013)—in particular, chapters 8 (Complex governance of Chinese enterprises) and 9
(To protect state-owned property assets) of Tanaka (2013).
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Reforms stagnated with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. When they were
revived by the 1992 "Southern Tour Lecture"—under a plan for "the establishment
of a socialist market economy system" (the Fourteenth Party Congress)—a plan was
set out for the establishment of a modern business system that contained "clarifying
ownership, clarifying rights and responsibilities, separating administration and
management of enterprises, and making management more scientific". Attempts
began at converting state-owned enterprises into public limited companies (i.e., the
ownership reform of state-owned enterprises—namely, "shareholders' rights" and
"corporate property"). Having converted state-owned enterprises into public limited
companies, there was a need for corporate law, which has two aims: the independence
(efficiency) of corporate management by the separation of ownership and manage
ment, and the diversification of fund-raising. One consideration in the early stages of
establishing corporate law was the introduction of shares (stocks) alongside a prop
erty system that ran on the principle of "putting a public property system at the
core" and thus maintaining the predominance of the public property system. However,
because the objective was set in 1992 for China to acquire World Trade Organization
(WTO) membership, demand arose for the establishment of corporate law that
followed global standards. As a result, corporate law was established in China in
1993 (and executed the following year); this was highly valued as a watershed
moment in the history of law in China, as it removed differentiation in the ownership
system by adopting the "equal treatment of shareholders." However, regarding the
problem of state-owned share management that could not be addressed with corpo
rate law, new management stipulations were introduced by "temporary regulations
on state-owned shares of public limited companies" (hereinafter referred to as tempo
rary regulations), which was established in November 1994; it guaranteed that public
limited companies reorganized from state-owned enterprises would, with some excep
tions, have state-owned shares and be in a dominant position.
Since the establishment of corporate law, state-owned enterprises as parent
companies have given rise to many public limited companies and their shares are
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (both established in 1990) and
funds are accepted from any ordinary investor. Generally speaking, large-scale, state-
owned enterprises have been made into groups that lie at the foundation of the
Chinese economy. Almost none of the enterprises at the top of the groups have been
made into public limited companies; either these top enterprises or the state retain
the majority of shares in their subsidiaries and second-tier subsidiaries that have
been made into public limited companies, and they thus reserve the right of manage
ment. Additionally, within Chinese shares, some circulate and some are non-circu-
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lating. In public limited companies dominated by state-owned shares (e.g., state
shares, shares of state-owned enterprises), the majority of shares are non-circulating.
Furthermore, in legislation since the emergence of corporate law, there have been
no laws that continue on this path, and even in the 2007 Law of Realty or the 2008
Companies' State-owned Assets Law, differentiation according to ownership was not
removed; the latter seemed to elevate the status of the 1994 temporary regulations.
Chinese state-owned enterprises are divided into central enterprises managed by
the central government (State Council) and regional enterprises managed by the
regional governments, but save for affiliated finance companies (managed by the
Ministry of Finance), the responsibility for the management of state-owned assets in
practice falls on the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
of the State Council (hereinafter referred to as SASAC) and SASACs of each
regional governments. Regarding the assets of enterprises managed by SASACs, this
is prescribed by the Companies' State-owned Assets Law, but it has enlarged the
scope of the stipulated business management of executive personnel, as the tempo
rary regulations had specifically restricted the management duties of state-owned
shares. In this way, while it might seem that corporate laws have removed differen
tiation within the property system, in practice, the dominance of the public property
system (state property system) has suddenly been revived in tandem with the tempo
rary regulations. From then until now, the principle of "putting the public property
system at the core" has been firmly maintained, and it was an especially striking
trend following the acquisition of WTO membership. This has given rise to a situa-
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Figure 6: Reforms to the ownership system of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
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tion in which one could say that "the state advances, and the private sector retreats,"
rather than "the state retreats, the private sector advances."
If the progress of ownership reforms after the Reform and Opening-up Policy
regarding the above state-owned enterprises were to be schematized in terms of
ownership typology, it would be as shown in Figure 6.
In Figure 6, Type A ownership O shows obvious ownership of state-owned enter
prises before the Reform and Opening-up Policy. State-owned enterprises existed only
to carry out orders from the central government. Following the Reform and
Opening-up Policy, the first movement toward reform was in the direction of
increasing management autonomy in state-owned enterprises, thus aligning with
stage O of Type AD ownership. The next movement was toward a "management
contract system," introduced in 1987, that corresponded to the land contract system
in agriculture; this aligns with stage 0 of Type D ownership. To this point, it has
proceeded in the exact same form as the movement in land ownership reforms in
rural area, as shown in Figure 5. However, the stage O reforms since the early 1990s
did not, as with agriculture, create a separation between use and management, but
fundamentally divided ownership itself. Following the establishment in 1992 of corpo
rate law, the conversion of state-owned enterprises into public limited companies was
promoted, but in centrally run companies and large state-owned enterprises belonging
to the industries most important to the state, most of the stock in those state-owned
enterprises that had been converted to stock was held by the state or by parent
companies, who reserved the right of management. In centrally controlled enterprises
and large state-owned enterprises, the state reserves control, because there are two
types of stocks (shares)—namely state-owned stock and non-state-owned stock.
Moreover, there are circulating stock and non-circulating stock. On the other hand,
small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, the majority of which fell under the
local government umbrella, were converted to stock, but because the local govern
ment participates in the board of directors of enterprises in which the majority of
the stock is state-owned, the right of control is reserved; even if none of the stock
is state-owned, not only will party organizations attempt to bridge the gap, but also
the local government economic committee will become extensively concerned with
technological innovation and fund-raising for management reform.
15) Although the data are a little old, according to the 2008 second industrial census, among the approximately
5,000,000 companies in China, about 75% of privately owned enterprises are outside the sphere of corporate
law; the public limited companies within that sphere comprise no more than 15% of the total. Regarding
privately owned enterprises, it is important to bear in mind that China has a system of public property
for land; therefore, privately owned enterprises do not own land, and may obtain land use rights for only
a limited period of time. For more on this, see Tanaka (2013), p.l37 (see note 2).
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In any event, with the reform of state-owned enterprises in a manner similar to
that seen with the reform of the land ownership system in rural areas, steps 0~®
of the process shown in Figure 6 correspond to the process of "functional capitalism"
shown in Figure 3. Movements toward stage O may be progressing or intensifying.
7. Conclusion
This paper focused on China's ownership system—which constitutes the corner
stone of socialism there—in order to explain the realities of China's "socialist market
economy." It also examined and considered the ownership system reform movement
since the Reform and Opening-up Policy, based on the four types of ownership
system and a five-point framework by which to analyze ownership systems. Four
conclusions derive from this investigation.
First of all, based on these four types and five points, the main points of "func
tional socialism" and its corollary "functional capitalism" were schematized clearly
(i.e.. Figures 2 and 3, respectively). Between functional socialism and socialism itself,
and between functional capitalism and capitalism itself, there exist large barriers
that are difficult to overcome. That is to say, in focusing on the subject (SI) of Figures
2 and 3, it becomes clear that functional socialism (and accordingly, capitalism, which
is its basis) is a society that fundamentally values individual freedom (self-determi
nation), while functional capitalism (and accordingly, socialism, which is its basis) is
a society that fundamentally values the guidance of the state. Therefore, it is natural
that the barriers would be difficult to overcome.
Second, reforms to the land ownership system in rural China and reforms to
state-owned enterprises in towns and cities were implemented at different times and
in concretely different ways, but the path those reforms have taken to the present
day accurately corresponds to the functional capitalism shown in Figure 3. In other
words, the first stage of reforms and of functional capitalism is in separating the
contents of property in socialist notions of property, to create "two partitions" of use
and ownership, or management and ownership; the land ownership system reform,
and the reforms to state-owned enterprises, followed the exact same process. The
next stage pertains to the "three partitions" of management, use, and ownership—or,
management, ownership 2, and ownership 1—and this construction of property corre
sponds to the stage of the "socialist market economy." Accordingly, the construction
of property, which constitutes the very foundation of a "socialist market economy," is
extremely unique to contemporary China; one could even say that a new construction
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of property is being carried out there. However, I would be unable but to say that
these were created as desperate measures, while adhering to socialist ideology and
maintaining the public property system.
Third, the three periods of Reform and Opening-up Policy correspond to land
reforms and ownership reforms.^''^ The first was in the 1978-84 period, during which
only markets within the limits of a planned economy were permitted (planning >
markets); in that planned economy, land ownership by allocation held a central posi
tion. The second was in the 1985-92 period, during which regulation and markets
attained equal positions (planning = markets); this was a period established from the
draft deliberation of the Land Management Law (i.e., arguments over the coexistence
of allocation and transfer). The third period, running from 1992 to the present day,
is the period during which markets clearly exceed control (planning < markets)—a
period during which there is movement towards cancelling the coexistence of alloca
tion and transfers. Periods 1, 2, and 3 correspond to stages (2), (3), and ®, or to ®,
®, and o. of the Reform and Opening-up Policy, as shown in Figures 5 and 6; none
theless, it is important to note that the final period of reform has not progressed as
planned. In other words, it is not guaranteed that the "planning < markets" stage
will move towards a suitable ownership system.
Fourth and finally, and closely related to the third conclusion above, while in the
third aforementioned period the aspect of planning may have fallen in importance
relative to the market, the reality of reforms to ownership in practice shows that
the role of the government has not diminished: there still exist regulations on owner
ship that work to maintain the public property system. The principle of "the party
being in charge of personnel" is rigorously enforced, and there is excessive interven
tion on the part of SASACs into the management of state-owned enterprises.^®^ From
this viewpoint, the third stage of the Reform and Opening-up Policy—namely, the
condition of the "socialist market economy"—may be appropriately described as "plan
ning < market < state (government)." Having revised this viewpoint on ownership
rights to consider the problem of "control area," if one were to schematize this a
16) For more on the possibility of diverse forms of capitalism following the collapse of socialism, see Boumol,
Litan, and Schramm (2007).
17) For more on this separation into three periods, see Oda (2002), pp.62-3.
18) Xu (2008) focuses on the conversion of state-owned enterprises into corporate business enterprises, and
points out that regional government provides guidance and plays a large role in enterprise management
(e.g., technical guidance and fund-raising), regardless of whether it owns part of the company—even after
they have been converted into corporate business enterprises. This is considered a "local development
principle system," and in Chinese society, where there is no spontaneous or autonomous system formation
independent of the state, there is a need to leave room for government intervention with regard to enter
prise management. For more on this, see Xu (2008), pp.172-4.
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little provocatively, the condition of a "socialist market economy"—as the third stage
of the Reform and Opening-up Policy (step ® in Figure 5 and O in Figure 6)—can
be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: The reality of the "socialist market economy"
The above four points are conclusions that derive from this investigation and
discussion.
(Professor of Economics, Comparative Economic Systems)
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